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Introduction
Four Types of Questions About Well-Being
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) famously argued that human happiness should be
conceived as the fundamental principle of human conduct, both psychologically
and morally. The desire to be happy normally guides individuals in their decisions
in life, and in as far it does not, he believed it should guide them. Similarly,
governments ought to regard happiness as the standard for improving society. In
Bentham’s time, this was seen as a revolutionary idea by which he aimed to
counteract the force of tradition, superstition, and speculative systems of thought.
Bentham claimed that the happiness principle alone followed from the dictates of
reason. “Systems which attempt to question it,” he wrote, “deal in sounds instead
of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.” (Bentham
1789/1823 [Chapter 1, Section I]). With hindsight, we can say that this assertion
was perhaps a bit overconfident. As it soon came to light, the happiness principle
too has its drawbacks, one of the most prominent being the difficulty to measure it.
Others objected to it on the ground that people’s happiness falls outside of the
purview of government: people know best what is good for themselves. Due to
recent scientific progress, these two arguments have now lost much of their force
and as a result Bentham’s thinking has made a major comeback.
Nowadays, the first objection is losing much of its urgency as the modern
science of subjective well-being continues to develop its methods to measure
people’s happiness. One very influential method is questionnaire-based and asks
people how satisfied they are with their life on, for example, a 0–5 scale, either in a
global sense or in some specific domain of their life. Another method probes the
emotional responses of people. This can be done in real-time, while they are
engaged in their daily routines, or retrospectively, for instance by querying them
about these emotions at the end of their day. Other techniques rely on brain scans
or the measurement of physiological proxies of happiness. Such techniques enable
us to learn what conditions are particularly apt to human beings experiencing
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subjective well-being, how strong the influence of these conditions are, and to
what degree these different measurement methods interrelate and validate each
other.
The force of the second objection is also undermined by progress in this field of
research, as it has been demonstrated that people surprisingly often fail in securing
their own well-being when left to their own devices (Gilbert 2007, Haybron,
2007). By focusing on the wrong things, or through short-sightedness, people end
up in far less favorable conditions than they could be—even by their own
standards. Many of us, for example, find a high income important. Yet arguably we
find it too important: the evidence suggests that money does not contribute much
to happiness once a certain threshold level has been achieved.1 Prima facie, the
fact that people are so fallible in these regards provides a reason to develop public
policies that engage with these human shortcomings and so increase subjective
well-being.
Subjective well-being scholars have argued that governments should focus less
on income as the standard for social well-being but should instead direct their
attention to what really matters: well-being itself. For instance, Nobel Prize winner
Daniel Kahneman and his coworkers have recommended that governments use this
new research on happiness to enrich their bookkeeping methods and develop
National Well-Being Accounts. Joseph Stiglitz and Armatya Sen, two further
Nobelists, have likewise expressed concerns about traditional, social, and
economic indicators and emphasized the need to develop better ones. These
appeals have not remained without success: discontent with traditional measures
and optimism about the new possibilities now resonate beyond academia,
especially within the circles of politicians and policy makers. Currently, the
UN, the OECD, the European commission and countries like Australia, Bhutan,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have each issued statements that the
subjective well-being of their citizens should be used as a guide for policy-making
and as an indicator of its success; some of them have also taken steps toward
implementation of this principle. Bhutan has famously gone furthest in this
direction and uses a Gross National Happiness Index to guide policies and track
progress.
For the study of well-being—what it is, how it works, and how to apply it for
policy objectives—four types of questions are especially germane. The present
volume is structured around these four issues. The first concerns our understanding
of the concept of well-being: what is well-being, what does it consist in? The other
three we borrow from John Rawls (2001). In his work on justice, Rawls argued
that when working toward a more just society one should ask whether policies and
courses of action are “likely to be effective” at the level of the individual (taking
into account human psychology), whether they are “politically possible” and
1 This is sometimes referred to as the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin 1974). The exact relationship
between income and subjective well-being is contested, however (see e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers
2008). See also various contributions in Diener, Helliwell and Kahneman (2010).
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whether they are “morally permissible” (Rawls 2001, p. 89) Our concern is with
well-being, not justice, but the same set of requirements apply.
1. The nature of well-being. At the most general level, a person’s well-being tells
us how well his or her life is going. This means that the concept of well-being
has both a descriptive and an evaluative component. For example, whether a
certain individual is very happy is something that can be true or false: it is a
matter of fact. At the same time, to say that somebody is happy conveys eval-
uative meaning. It expresses approval or endorsement: a judgment that this
person is on the right track, that she should keep doing what she is doing. Since
well-being has both descriptive and evaluative components—to use the words of
Bernard Williams: it is a “thick concept” (Williams 2006)—it attracts the
attention of empirically minded scientists as well as normatively oriented phi-
losophers, as this volume attests. As mentioned, empirical scholars apply various
methods to measure well-being. Some are more cognitively oriented, others
more affectively, and still others physiological. We can understand this variety
of methods in different ways. They can be taken to represent different approa-
ches to one and the same subject: well-being as a unitary entity; alternatively,
each of them can be taken to measure a different aspect of well-being.
What well-being consists in is an issue that precedes its measurement. We
might call it a philosophical question, and there are predictably many different
theories of well-being within philosophy. Derek Parfit (1986) has usefully dis-
tinguished these theories in three categories: desire satisfaction theories, hedonic
experience theories, and objective list theories.2 From a practical point of view
this variety may at first sight seem unfortunate, possibly even dispiriting. When
one is interested in measuring and furthering well-being, it can be highly frus-
trating to get bogged down in philosophical questions regarding its true nature.
However, a closer look shows that the requirement of practical applicability can
be used to re-examine our most prominent theories of well-being: we can seek to
determine where these theories overlap and in what sense they are complemen-
tary. This is an exercise that may well bear fruit. It is the subject of Chaps. 1 and 2
of the present volume, “Towards Consensus on Well-Being” by Tim Taylor and
“Towards a Widely Acceptable Framework for the Study of Personal Well-
Being” by SamWren-Lewis. Independently of each other these authors both argue
that subjective well-being can be conceived as a value in itself, as an indicator of
what is valuable, or as a resource to create value. Through this troika Wren Lewis
ties together the main empirical approaches to the study of well-being, while
Taylor ties together the most prominent philosophical theories. The prospect that
empirical science and philosophy could mutually inform each other and are not
doomed to talk past each other is further explored in Chap. 3 “Well-Being,
Science, and Philosophy” by Raffaele Rodogno.
2. Effective at the level of the individual. Human beings are finite beings: it is
a fact of life that we cannot get or do whatever we may happen to want.
2 See also Griffin (1986), Sumner (1996) and Brey (2012).
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Proposals regarding the promotion of well-being, either for specific individuals
or for society at large, must meet the condition that they are in accordance with
human psychology. They must take note of human capacities, dispositions, and
the limits of what people can achieve and learn. These constraints are not fixed,
however, as they depend on the resources and technologies that are available.
Our prospects of improving well-being are dependent on our knowledge of
what makes people happy and their lives go well. Here, the current insights from
positive psychology, with its focus on happiness and positive functioning, are
especially helpful. In Chap. 4, “Improving the Health Care Sector with a Hap-
piness-Based Approach,” Laura A. Weiss, Sarah Kedzia, Aad Francissen and
Gerben J. Westerhof show how this knowledge can be applied to help people
who are trapped in a vicious spiral of illness, depression, and social isolation via
what is called “the Happiness Route”.
Aids for improving people’s happiness must connect with what people have in
stock themselves, their natural dispositions and capacities. This includes their
potential to use self-insight, i.e., to use their knowledge of how their own moti-
vations can change due to the choices they make, as Rixtar Arlegi and Miriam
Teschl demonstrate in Chap. 5, “Conflict, Commitment and Well-Being.” Their
chapter addresses an important problem for desire satisfaction-based theories of
well-being: how to deal with the fact that people often have conflicting desires.
Commitment is a technique that allows individuals to cope with this problem of
conflicting motivations. Alegri and Teschl contribute to our understanding of this
technique by arguing that commitment assisted by self-knowledge can be
understood in terms of a volitional solution to motivation conflict.
Natural human psychological capacities are of crucial importance in regards to
well-being, but in our modern age technology plays no less important a role when
it comes to the prospect of increasing people’s happiness. In Chap. 6, “Can
Technology Make Us Happy? Ethics, Spectator’s Happiness and the Value of
Achievement,” Andreas Spahn outlines the different ways in which modern
technology contributes to different aspects of well-being. Positioning himself on
the side of Enlightenment optimism with regards to technology, rather than suf-
fering from Romantic uneasiness, Spahn discusses the potential of “persuasive
technologies” that can make people both more happy and more likely to act as
morality demands. The subsequent two chapters concentrate on specific tech-
nologies for improving well-being. Birgit Beck and Barbara Stroop in their
contribution “A Biomedical Shortcut to (Fraudulent) Happiness? An Analysis of
the Notions of Well-Being and Authenticity Underlying Objections to Mood
Enhancement” (Chap. 7) question the validity of the common view that mood
enhancers should not be used outside of the medical context to make people feel
happier because this would merely lead to a fake kind of happiness. They argue
that this view is mistaken and that mood enhancers can improve genuine well-
being. Not all technologies need to work through such physiological interven-
tions, as Judith Annett and Stefan Berglund show in their “Increasing Societal
Well-Being Through Enhanced Empathy Using Computer Games” (Chap. 8).
Theymake a case for the development and use of a special kind of social computer
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game, designed to increase and stimulate people’s empathic capabilities. This
should smoothen the interaction between people, which in turn will improve
societal well-being.
3. Politically possible. Even if it may be possible to increase well-being for some
individuals because their psychological makeup is favorable to interventions that
are presently within technological reach, it does not follow that the same holds
on a larger scale. At the political level, problems that will undermine the pro-
motion of well-being on a societal scale may, for example, arise due to various
sorts of conflicting individual aims, or because of disrupting interaction effects.
In order to further well-being in a given society, appropriate institutional
arrangements and mechanisms are required. In democracies, people must be
willing to give their votes to policies that improve well-being, politicians have
to endorse such policies, and policy makers and bureaucrats have to implement
them. The route to higher societal happiness levels is for a large part a political
route, and therefore dependent on the way collective decision-making is
organized.
The question of promoting well-being can enter the political domain in
various ways. Political questions arise, for instance, when the provision of a
public good impacts societal well-being. This is the subject of Chap. 9 “Well-
Being, Happiness and Sustainability” by Bengt Brülde. A more sustainable way
of life requires drastic changes in consumption, both with respect to its pattern
and to its level. How to achieve this environmental goal is an intricate puzzle
that involves solving questions regarding the scale and distribution of behav-
ioral types and of particular activities that impact sustainability and well-being.
Another factor that advances issues of well-being into the political domain is
the occurrence of interaction effects. In Chap. 10 “The Political Pursuit of
Happiness: A Popperian Perspective on Layard’s Happiness Policy” Aloys
Prinz and Björn Bünger discuss status competition: the fact that a person’s
well-being is not only determined by absolute facts about their lives, but also is
affected by relative comparisons. To the extent that one person’s well-being
depends on how well others are doing, the pursuit of happiness becomes a
zero-sum game. If this is the case, then governments should arguably intervene
to prevent a self-defeating rat race. Prinz and Bünger address this question and
examine the possible traps and obstacles on the political road toward reducing
the effects of positional comparisons on happiness.
Knowing how to operationalize well-being indicators and knowing how to
foster well-being on an individual level do not entail that we know how to
promote well-being on the scale of a whole society. This is demonstrated by
Chap. 11 “Measuring Quality of Life―An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
Agenda-Setting Dynamics in Britain and the European Union” by Ian Bache.
Whether an idea catches on depends on the political context. Through a
comparative analysis between the UK and the EU, Bache shows how institu-
tional design and political entrepreneurship helped determine the success and
timing of the idea that we can improve society through application of the new
Benthamite subjective well-being methods and indicators.
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4. Morally permissible. Individual and political feasibility together do not suffice to
justify the new-Benthamite endeavor. Knowing how to improve the well-being
of (a subset of) the population and being able to install the appropriate policy to
implement this may be sufficient to ascertain that governments can improve
individual and societal well-being, but that does not imply they also should.
Well-being is not the only political value, and neo-Benthamism is not the only
moral theory. The goal of fostering well-being among a group of people seems
laudable on its own, but any attempts to put it into practice must be carefully
considered taking note of their effects on other values, goals, and considerations.
These may set constraints, point to trade-offs, or even put the entire Benthamite
project into doubt.
This means that even when it is possible to implement the happiness principle
on an individual level by means of effective psychological and technological
methods and on the societal level by designing and using institutional and
political mechanisms, there can be weighty reasons to refrain from doing so.
This is what Jan-Willem van der Rijt argues in Chap. 12 “The Political Turn
Towards Happiness.” Van der Rijt examines the reasons to be wary of a gov-
ernment that is too happily devoted to promoting the happiness of its citizenry,
to a Benthamism unbound.
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